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Several authors have recently investigated the effects of changes in sugar policies.  Studies have 
focused on multilateral trade liberalization, either on the effect of an extension of preferential regimes 
(e.g. the EBA), or on the effect of domestic reforms.  Perplexingly, the different studies provide results 
that are largely inconsistent, even for rather similar scenarios.  Some authors find that market 
liberalization will result in large welfare gains and significant changes in international trade.  Others 
believe that the overall gains will actually be limited, due to inelastic demand (i.e. small initial 
Harberger triangles on the consumer side), persistence of supply control (production quotas) and 
because large rents need to be reduced before reforms actually become binding and affect output.   
The degree of incoherence in the quantitative results that have been published is troublesome.  The 
inconsistencies exceed what is normally observed between different modeling approaches (general vs 
partial equilibrium) in the agricultural sector.  Here, the effects of trade liberalization are sometimes 
contradictory and the magnitude of the differences in, say, world price variations or change in welfare 
is striking.  While there are several explanations for the diverging results regarding the effects of 
reforms on the world market, the changes in EU sugar net trade appear to be of particular importance.  
There is a large degree of uncertainty as to the level of EU sugar supply under different policy 
conditions.  Because producers have been largely isolated from world market signals for decades, 
there is little statistical variability to exploit, and the "guesstimates" of supply elasticities and 
production costs rely on thin evidence.  We also believe that not enough attention has been paid to 
some specific characteristics of EU production, and in particular to the determinants of the supply of 
"C" sugar, i.e. sugar produced outside production quotas (C sugar is bound to disappear within the 
next years, due to the EU reform and the 2005 ruling of the WTO dispute settlement body).   
A first objective of this paper is to model EU sugar supply, accounting for specific aspects such as a 
potential cross-subsidy between production quota sugar and C sugar, and the existence of rents in both 
the farm and processing sectors.  Another objective is to provide estimates of the effects of i/ the 
recent EU sugar reform (still to be implemented);  ii/ the elimination of EU export subsidies by 2013, 
a decision adopted (with some side conditions) in the framework of the WTO.  
We first provide a brief survey of the various studies assessing the impact of liberalization of the sugar 
sector.  The specification of the EU supply response seems to be a major determinant of the world 
market equilibrium.  We then investigate some specific aspects of EU sugar production, in particular 
those that might result in a cross-subsidy between in-quota and C sugar.  We propose a way to model 
the sugar market that includes these specific aspects of EU producer and processor behavior. We then 
estimate econometrically the parameters that allow us to account for this cross subsidization and to 
calibrate production costs.  Finally, we integrate this representation of the sugar sector in a general  3
equilibrium (GE) model of the EU economy in order to assess the effect of the November 2005 sugar 
reform and the effect of future international discipline under the WTO. 
 
1. The effects of liberalizing sugar markets 
 
Some ambiguous results.  Recent studies have provided some information about the effects of sugar 
market liberalization.  Clearly, the scenarios vary according to authors, but the variation in the findings 
can hardly be explained by differences in the policy changes that are modeled.  Some authors find that 
even a partial liberalization in the sugar market will generate a very large increase in world prices.  El 
Obeid and Beghin 's results illustrate such findings (El Obeid and Beghin, 2005).  Using a partial 
equilibrium model to simulate the removal of trade distortions, they find a large increase in the world 
price, especially when domestic support is reduced, in spite of a large drop in demand that follows the 
removal of consumption subsidies in some countries.  One explanation is the considerable decrease in 
the production of sugar in the EU, i.e. a fall of 61% under multilateral liberalization.  As a result, the 
EU becomes a net importer of some 8 million tons of sugar. 
Other models that rely on a relatively similar structure (partial equilibrium model, non spatial, etc.) 
lead to different results.  For a similar increase in the world price, Wohlgenant (1999) finds that EU 
production increases by 2% and that the EU remains a net exporter of 2.5 million tons.  Poonyth et al 
(2000) also find that EU production is barely affected by the reduction in intervention price required to 
export without subsidies, and that, overall, EU exports would remain relatively stable.  The OECD 
(2005) finds that EU production would decrease by some 60% under their trade liberalization scenario.  
Adenäuer et al (2004) find that exports would decrease significantly if export subsidies were phased 
out.  Witzke and Kuhn (2003) find a significant decrease in the production of C sugar for a 30% 
decrease in sugar price. 
The various general equilibrium approaches also lead to different, although perhaps less contrasted, 
results.  Under a reform that liberalizes the sugar market, Frandsen et al (2003) show mainly an 
erosion of rents.  They find that production is only marginally affected by a strong reduction of the 
intervention price in France, Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom.  Bouët et al (2005) find that 
the reduction in EU supply is significant if tariffs are cut by 60% and export subsidies removed, but 
the resulting increase in world market price is minimal.  Van der Mensbrugghe et al (2003) find that 
the EU becomes a very large importer of sugar under a multilateral liberalization of the world market. 
Why do the results differ so much?  There are many explanations for these discrepancies across 
studies.  Some refer to the model specification.
1  Different assumptions about some key factors such as 
                                                 
1 The sensitivity to the assumption of a homogenous vs differentiated good à la Armington is shown 
by Van der Mensbrugghe et al (2003).  Models that include an endogenous supply of land in Brazil 
(such as Van der Mensbrugghe et al, 2003 or Bouët et al, 2005) tend to show smaller increase in the 
world price.  Partial equilibrium models often provide larger price effects than the GE ones.  4
the supply response in LDCs and Brazil also have a significant impact on the world price.  The way 
some upstream, downstream and side-sectors (energy) are treated also plays a role, because the effect 
of sugar reforms also depends on the behavior of the processing sector and on the linkage with the 
ethanol market.  However, a major explanation of the differences across models lies in the different 
response of EU supply to a particular policy shock.  The EU is the second largest exporter of sugar, 
principally due to its support policy, and the fourth largest importer, mainly because of its 
development aid policy.  Changes in the EU net trade position have a significant impact on the world 
market equilibrium.  
Inferring the effect of the 2005 sugar reform (yet to be implemented), and, a fortiori, the effect of 
multilateral trade liberalization on EU supply is cumbersome.  The present EU sugar policy is complex 
and it is understandable that modelers have taken different routes to cope with the difficulty of 
representing adequately all the components of the Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar: 
two types of production quotas ("A" and "B") facing different supported prices, high specific tariffs, 
preferential access under import quotas, a safeguard clause, the possibility of producing out-of-quota 
sugar for the world market, levies for funding exports of in-quota sugar, etc (see Van der Linde et al, 
2000, for a complete description of the sector, or Frandsen et al, 2003, for a briefer one).  It is difficult 
to assess EU production costs and rents.  Producers expect significant changes in prices and quota 
allocation and some hope for some compensation.  That is, information on costs is often subject to 
strategic behavior and can hardly be trusted.  Production quotas have been in place for more than 30 
years and the administrative price has shown little variability.  This makes it difficult to infer the effect 
of changes that would induce large variations away from the present equilibrium.  Because of the two-
tier production quotas, it is unclear how the quantity produced would respond to price changes.  The 
problem is made worse by the interaction between the agricultural and processing sector.  Indeed, 
there is evidence that part of the support to the beet sector is retained by the processing sector, which 
will be also affected by reforms.  Because of high fixed costs and the need to find suppliers of beet 
within limited distances, strategies of processing firms are likely to interact with those of the farm 
sector and affect the overall EU supply response, in a way largely unknown to modelers. 
In brief, the uncertainty about EU supply response under different policies is a particular problem, and 
assumptions in this area appear crucial in explaining the outcome of any given model.  Two issues 
appear particularly important:  the level of costs and rents under production quotas; and the modeling 
of the supply of C sugar.  By driving the EU supply response, assumptions regarding these two issues 
play a large role in the results obtained by the different authors working on market liberalization and 
policy reform in the sugar sector. 
EU production costs.  A major problem in modeling EU sugar supply is to assess which prices and 
costs actually drive production.  The EU CMO sets an intervention price for sugar, from which a base 
price for beets is derived, but market prices may be different from regulated prices (Swedish  5
Competition Authority, 2002).  Moreover, the actual price received by producers depends on local 
agreements and there are no reliable statistics on the price of beets within the A and the B quotas.  Van 
der Linde et al (2000), Eurocare (2003), LMC (2004) compiled some information on costs of 
production.  Estimates relying on budget generators and engineering data suggest that costs of 
production are close to the intervention price for sugar and the administrative ("base") price for beets 
(i.e. roughly 47 €/ton of beet until the implementation of the 2005 reform).  However, econometric or 
linear programming- based estimates of marginal costs or "opportunity costs" (i.e. the cost of 
producing one unit of beet instead of alternative crops) are much lower (Bureau et al., 1997).  Recent 
estimates for France suggest that they were below 18 €/ton of beet before the June 2003 CAP reform 
(see Rozakis and Sourie, 2005).  
The EU production of C sugar has been significant over the last decade, representing 4 to 13% of the 
18 to 20 million tons of sugar now produced in the EU-25, depending on the year.  It is therefore 
tempting to believe that, at least in the most efficient regions, producers respond to the world price. 
However, an indirect implication of this assumption is that the resulting EU supply curve is such that a 
fall in the intervention price would mainly erode rents, but not affect production.  Even though this 
seems consistent with the existence of production of C sugar for the world market, the assumption that 
aggregate EU production responds to the marginal costs of the most efficient producers might lead to 
an underestimation of the impact of reforms on EU output. 
 
2. The microeconomics of EU sugar supply behavior 
 
Cross-subsidization of out-of quota C sugar by A and B sugar is sometimes seen as driving C sugar 
production.  Three possible effects can be identified. 
•  Some authors, and obviously the members of the WTO panel, consider that the high supported 
price for the production under A and B quotas covers fixed costs.  This would allow 
production of C sugar at low prices, given the need to recover only variable cost (Van der 
Linde et al, 2000; Schmidt, 2003).  If this is the case, it is not only marginal (variable) costs 
that drive EU sugar production.  A change in the in-quota price will affect the possibility of 
recovering fixed costs (Chau and de Gorter, 2005).   
•  During the recent period, world prices of sugar have been very low.  There is some empirical 
evidence that this price hardly covers the cost of even variable inputs, such as intermediate 
consumption (Rozakis and Sourie, 2005).  This suggests that some producers, if not all, lose 
money on some of the C sugar quantities they produce.  A possible explanation is that some 
producers grow C sugar beets as an insurance strategy against in-quota sugar revenues 
foregone when there are poor harvests.  Again, if it is the case, one cannot model EU supply 
as a function of marginal cost only.  It is necessary to work out more carefully the interaction  6
between the supply of C sugar and the level of the rent drawn from the production of in-quota 
sugar. 
•  Finally, another possibility is that C sugar was produced so as to build references when 
producers expected that the ongoing reforms would result in a particular allocation of future 
production rights, premium rights or compensation.  Again, if it is the case, this feature must 
be included in the modeling of EU sugar supply.   
These points may result in interactions between in-quota sugar and C sugar, and could play a role in 
the response of EU sugar production to price changes.  This may occur both at the beet production 
level and at the refined sugar production level.  In the next section, we address these three possible 
cases in a more analytical way.  
 
Cross subsidization through fixed costs.  The potential cross-subsidization between in-quota and C 
sugar can be modeled using a simple short run comparative static framework.  The short run profit 
maximizing problem of the beet producer in the presence of quasi-fixed factors can be written as (1). 
() z p z w y y C y p y p Max z
SR
y y . ; ; 2 1 2 2 1 1 , 2 1
− + − + = π                                                           (1), 
subject to  Quota y ≤ 1 ,  
 
where z denotes an aggregate of quasi-fixed primary factors (capital, self-employed labor and land 
owned or subject to long term leases) whose (exogenous) price is pz.  The variable w denotes the price 
of variable inputs;  p1 denotes the price of in-quota sugar beets;  p2 the price of out-of-quota beets;  y1 
the quantity produced in the quota; and y2 the quantity produced out of the quota (quantities of beets 
are expressed in sugar equivalent, so as to adjust for the sugar content).  
SR C  denotes the restricted or 
short run cost function. 
For certain levels of the marginal cost function, of the quota and of the price of C beets, the existence 
of quasi-fixed inputs may result in a cross-subsidy between in-quota and C beets.  This happens when 
p2 and y1 are such that the production of C sugar induces a lower average cost due to a larger 
production scale.  In such a situation profit maximization may result in a larger output than if the 
quantity y1 was not subsidized, i.e. if there was only one sugar price p2.  This situation is well 
described by Kopp and de Gorter (2005).  Figure 1 shows a special case where the price of C sugar is 
higher than the marginal (variable) cost AVC of producing at y1, explaining that a quantity y2 of C 
sugar is produced, while the price of C sugar does not cover its production cost (p2 lies below the short 
run average cost curve ATC
SR).  The fixed costs are covered by the in-quota sugar.  The production of 
C sugar is positive provided that the area abcd is larger than the area cefg in Figure 1.  In that case, the 
gains resulting from the economies of scale exceed the loss resulting from selling the extra quantities 
at p2. As pointed out by Kopp and de Gorter, abcd is always larger than cefg because the fixed costs at 
y1 (abhi) equal the fixed costs at y1+y2 (demk), meaning that abcd is equal to cefg + ihgfmk > cefg.   7
That is, if the out-of quota price is lower than the average total cost in the short run and the out-of-
quota price is greater than the average variable cost (a plausible case in C sugar producing regions), 
then there is cross-subsidization driving the production of out-of-quota sugar.  
 




Kopp and de Gorter (2005) also point out another possible case of cross subsidization when the out-of-
quota price p2 is lower than AVC and the in quota price p1 is greater than ATC in y1.  In such a case, 
there will be production of y2 if the costs saving due to returns to scale exceed the losses on the out-of 
quota market 
The analytical derivation of the optimal conditions is cumbersome, because of the discontinuity in the 
supply response introduced by the quota regime. The maximization program is such that one cannot 
assume that the equality between the marginal cost and the out-of-quota price drives production in a 
general case.  The level of quota must be large enough to ensure that the short run profit (profit less 
fixed costs) is positive.  Supply is then determined by the combination of two conditions: i/ that p2 
equals marginal cost ; and ii/ that  p1y1+p2y2-C(y1+y2,w,z)>0 (break even point). 
The considerations above suggest that the coverage of fixed costs by the rent provided to the in-quota 
production is a possible determinant of the supply of C sugar.  This idea was central in the decision of  8
the WTO panel that EU exports of C sugar should be considered as subsidized.  However, such a 
cross-subsidization cannot hold in the long run.  If quasi-fixed factors can adjust to their optimal level 
for production y1, then there is no point producing C sugar at loss as in Figure 1, for example.  The 
simple expression of the long run producer's profit maximization problem (3) and Hotelling's lemma 
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Because z can freely adjust, there will be no production of y2.  The reason is that there is no cost 
saving due to increasing returns to scale (caused by a non-optimal level of fixed cost at y1 in the short 
run) that can offset a loss in the out-of-quota market. Obviously, there might be production of C sugar 
in efficient firms where the long run marginal cost is lower than p2 at the production level y1, but in 
such cases, the difference between p1 and p2 is a simple rent, and there is arguably no cross subsidy.  
As pointed out by Witzke and Kuhn (2003), the quota regime has been in place for many decades 
almost without modification, and it is difficult to believe that the situation that has been taking place 
during the last years is merely a short run equilibrium.  Major non-convexities (indivisible inputs) 
could prevent firms from adjusting their production structure to the optimal input level corresponding 
to the quota as in (3).  However, in the beet sector, there are many opportunities to share machinery, to 
buy second hand machinery, and to purchase contract work.  Contract harvesting or planting costs are 
only slightly decreasing with the size of operation.  The fixed component in the cost of contract work 
is not large enough to provide a significant incentive for producing C beets so as to spread this fixed 
cost on a larger output.  Overall, the argument that the fixed costs of C sugar are covered by the quota, 
and that this explains the production of C sugar in the EU is not compelling. 
However, a recurrent problem in production economics is to define how long is the "long run".  In 
Europe, there is evidence that some equipment has a long service life (Ball et al, 1993).  In addition, in 
the processing sector, some equipment might be less divisible, or less easily adjustable than in 
agriculture, and fixed costs in refineries could be a reason for sugar processors to encourage farmers to 
produce C sugar.  For this reason, we keep open the possibility that the production of C sugar benefits 
from the high price of in-quota sugar, i.e. that there is some form of cross-subsidy, when we model the 
EU sugar sector. 
Quota overshooting as insurance.  Because of the high price received for in-quota sugar beets, 
producers may overshoot so as to make sure that they will capture the rent in case of poor harvests.  A  9
rational beet producer will accept losses on the C sugar, or on a share of the C sugar, in order to 
maximize expected profit.  The non-linearity in prices caused by the quota and the asymmetry between 
gains and losses caused by the dual price system result in kinked marginal returns, showing 
similarities with the classical concavity of the expected utility function.  In such a case, even a risk 
neutral producer will overshoot as prevention. 
A defendable assumption is that all costs are experienced by the time of harvesting.  In such a case, if 
the output harvested is one unit lower than the target quantity y1, the loss is p1.  If it is one unit larger, 
the extra profit is p2.  Let us call q the subjective probability that the actual yield exceeds the expected 
one by one unit.  The expected profit of the producer targeting a production y1 is 
p1.y1-C(y1)-q.p1+(1-q).p2.  Here, C denotes the long run cost function (rather similar behavior can be 
derived with a restricted cost function) and Cm denotes the marginal cost.  The expected profit of a 
producer targeting one unit of production above y1 (i.e. overshooting) is 
p1.y1+p2-C(y1+1)+(1-q).p2-q.p2, with C(y1+1)-C(y1)≈Cm(y1)).  That is, overshooting is rational 
provided that Cm(y1) -p2 < q(p1 - p2).  The higher the difference between the two prices, the more 
likely the overshooting.  
More formally, the introduction of an "insurance" behavior modifies the standard marginal conditions 
that characterize optimal production.  Following Roumasset (1977), the producer's expected profit 
maximization problem takes the form of a discontinuous function as in equation (4), where δ denotes 
the Kronecker symbol, and µr is the expected yield (unit sugar content times quantity of beets per 
hectare), under the assumption that variable costs are experienced before climatic conditions affect the 
final yields.  L denotes the quantity of land (acreage), r denotes the actual yield and the bar over y1 
denotes the quantity under quota. 
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Three conclusions can be drawn from equation (5) and from the fact that the bracketed term is 
positive, and therefore the right hand side of (5) is negative.  First, producers will overshoot and 
produce C sugar, since the determination of the optimal supply behavior responds to the condition that 
marginal costs equals the price p2 plus a positive term.  Second, this term depends positively on the  10
probability of a bad harvest.  Third, this positive term depends positively on the difference (p1-p2).  
This point is important because it shows that, under such an "insurance" behavior, there is a cross-
subsidy between in-quota and C sugar even in the long run, without the fixed cost effect described 
above.  Indeed, the higher p1, the more it becomes profitable to produce C sugar for insurance.  Note 
that this cross-subsidy is obviously linked to the fact that the quota is binding, otherwise equation (5) 
would collapse into the traditional condition Cm=p1. 
This relation does not prove that C sugar is formally cross-subsidized in the EU.  The incentive to 
overshoot is mitigated by the possibility of "carrying over" sugar quotas rights from one year to 
another, a feature of the EU CMO.  This possibility reduces significantly the cross-subsidy resulting 
from (5).  Some sugar processors also have private arrangements giving flexibility to beet suppliers to 
smooth the supply over several years, so as to prevent overshooting.  In addition, empirical evidence 
suggests that the insurance behavior is unlikely to explain all the C sugar production in the EU15 
(Adenäuer et al, 2004).  Indeed, the level of EU15 production is only consistent with expectations on 
yields that would be unrealistic.  However, the "overshooting" factor may explain a share of the C 
sugar production, and we believe that the resulting implicit cross-subsidy needs to be included in the 
modeling of EU supply response behavior. 
Expectations.  Projects for a reform of the EU CMO have circulated for decades before 2005.  It is 
possible that farmers have produced beyond the (static) optimum level, expecting that historical 
references will be used in the future.  Indeed, in the past reforms of the CAP, many quota allocations, 
premium rights or compensations have been given on the basis of historical references.  A 
precautionary behavior so as to "build up" potential references would be rational under particular 
expectations by producers and/or processors regarding future reforms.  Assume that producers expect 
that future quota mobility across the EU will result in closing sugar plants in some regions.  This 
assumption is realistic, since some sugar processors closed profitable plants in anticipation of the 
reform in 2005 (e.g. in Ireland).  Consider an efficient producer who expects that, in his area, local 
processors will manage to increase their sugar quota, and that the level of present production of C 
sugar will be used as a variable in allocating the new quota between individual beet producers.  (Other 
patterns of expectation are possible, but it is likely that farmers will end up with the idea that the more 
they produce C sugar beet, the more they will be eligible for extra compensation, or future reference 
values).  Let us use a subscript t+1 to denote expected prices and quantities in future period, a 
subscript t for the present period, and the variable τ to represent a discount factor.  The profit 
maximization problem of a producer like the one described above is: 
 
( )
() () z w y y C y p y p
z w y y C y p y p Max
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
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                                                    (6),  11
subject to y1,t< t y1  and y1,t+1< t y1 + λy2,t , where λ represents the degree to which the producer estimates 
that future quotas will be based on the present production of C sugar.  Maximization in y2t leads to a 
first order condition stating that Cmt = p2t +τ λ(p1,t+1-Cm(y t+1)).  That is, the optimal production of C 
sugar verifies the condition that Cmg=p2 plus a positive term.  This term depends on future rents, i.e. 
on future in-quota prices.  While it is likely that producers expect future in-quota prices to be lower 
than the present ones, the prospect that these prices will remain higher than the world price may 
explain present production of C sugar. 
Does this show that the C sugar is cross-subsidized?  Formally, there is no direct linkage between the 
in-quota sugar price and the supply of out-of-quota sugar, since the production of C sugar depends on 
future in-quota prices, and not on present in-quota prices.  However, if the "reference building" 
behavior does not introduce a formal cross-subsidy, it may be one of the explanations for the relatively 
high levels of C sugar produced during the recent years in the EU15, in spite of low world prices. 
 
3. Econometric identification of production costs 
Rents and production costs.  The three cases presented above suggest that modeling of EU production 
under the usual assumption, that producers maximize profit so that marginal revenue equals marginal 
costs, may incorrectly represent EU supply response.  If one calibrates the supply curve assuming such 
a relation in a simulation model, and then uses the prices observed to infer marginal costs, this may 
lead to construct an EU supply curve which lies below the actual one.  The fall in EU production that 
would take place under market liberalization could therefore be underestimated.  Overall, this might 
have a significant impact on the results obtained for world prices and trade. 
Several authors have acknowledged that the different effects above should lead to a modification in 
the traditional modeling of supply.  Adenäuer et al (2004) introduce shifts in the supply curve in order 
to account for some of the phenomena described above.  They identify the problem as being the 
representative agent assumption.  They account for the diversity of situations by using a larger number 
of representative farms.  Within their framework, the "insurance effect" described above affects 
differently two producers with different levels of marginal costs.  Once these individual behaviors are 
aggregated, the resulting supply curve is such that beet growers behave like if their quota endowments 
were higher than the actual ones.  
The existence of a gap between marginal revenue and marginal costs for the aggregate producer is 
central in our approach.  A common feature of the three effects described above (fixed costs, 
uncertainty on future yields and the asymmetry of gains/losses, expectation on future references) is 
that the producer's behavior leads to conditions between the marginal cost Cm and the out-of-quota 
price p2 of the type Cm=p2+θ, where θ is a positive function of p1, a negative function of p2 and a 
positive function of the quota.   12
We have little information on the value of θ. In order to characterize θ , we estimate econometrically 
the linkage between the decision to plant L hectares in sugar beet in one hand, and sugar prices and 
quotas on the other hand.  We assume that Cm is a linear (increasing) function of L and we include a 
trend t to account for technical change, i.e. Cm=W(a+brL+ct), where a, b and c  are coefficients to be 
estimated and W is a price index of inputs.  The variable θ  is also assumed to depend in a linear way 
on the in-quota and out-of quota sugar prices, i.e. θ = d+eQ+f(p1-p2), with Q being the level of quota,  
d, e, f  being coefficients to be estimated.  Combining the expressions of Cm and  θ , a synthetic 






















2 1 2                                             (7), 
Econometric estimation of the coefficients of (7) makes it possible to estimate the cross subsidy 
between in-quota sugar and C sugar, the production costs and the supply elasticities.  In order to do so 
we add an error term to equation (7), reflecting all other variables omitted in this specification.
 2  We 
use a Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) estimation technique.  This technique is robust for small 
samples.  It is also useful for integrating inequality constraints that are consistent with the theory (such 
as b>0; θ ≥0, see the appendix).  In addition, GME allows estimation of non linear functions, which 
makes it possible to perform specification tests on a larger range of functional forms.  The method 
used is described in Golan et al (2001).  We test the significance of estimates by the ratio of entropy 
(Golan et al., 1999).   
There is barely any literature on the properties of GME estimators under inequality constraints, but 
there is little reason to believe the GME method solves the spurious regression problem if series are 
non stationary and non cointegrated.  We thus test for stationarity using three common tests.  Results 
are reported in the appendix.  Because the EU sugar market organization has not changed over the last 
years, there is only a limited variability in some of the observations.  Even though the goodness of fit  
looks satisfactory, the different stationarity tests are often inconsistent (see the appendix).  That is, 
econometric estimates are rather fragile.  This is a limitation of the study, since the parameters d, e and 
f  play a role in the computation of production costs and rents.  In each of the six countries producing 
C sugar where (7) was estimated, at least one parameter entering in the expression of θ, i.e. f, and e, is 
significantly different from zero.  This suggests that there is indeed some form of cross subsidy 
between C sugar production and the quota rent.  The costs of production presented in Table 1 are 
derived from the parameters estimates of equation (7).  Estimates suggest low production costs in 
Belgium, Germany and France, and high production costs in Italy and Spain.  This is in line with the 
                                                 
2 The specification as in equation (7) performs poorly in the case of Italy. An alternative specification 
is used θ=d+eQ+f(p1- p2)Q. In that case, e and f are not constrained.   13
findings of the EC Commission (2004).  The low costs in the Netherlands and the UK are perhaps 
more surprising.  But they are in line with Van der Linde et al, and could be explained by the scale of 
the plants in the processing sector (see Van der Linde, et al 2000, Figure 14.2).  We also estimate the 
supply elasticity to a change in the net in-quota price.  These estimates are rather low for Northern EU 
countries and larger for Southern countries. The weighted average elasticity is 0.23, in line with 
previous estimates (Bureau et al 1997). 










Netherlands 355 0.33  0.83 
United Kingdom  388  0.11  0.60 
Belgium 407  0.06  0.82 
France 397  0.14 0.78 
Germany 424  0.22  0.96 
Spain 527  0.14  0.87 
Italy 551  0.90  0.45 
 
 
4. The simulation framework 
 
The GE model. The modeling of EU sugar sector is included in a larger GE framework in order to 
assess the effect of trade liberalization and policy reforms on the EU economy.  At first glance, this 
may seem an "overkill" strategy, since the sugar sector is unlikely to be large enough to have 
significant macroeconomic effects.  However, there is no serious obstacle to including a more detailed 
sector within a broader framework.  The GE framework is appropriate for modeling multi-output 
production, consistent with the fact that sugar is always produced in combination with other crops.  In 
addition, proper modeling of the EU sugar response to policy changes requires that one takes into 
account the interaction of the farm sector with both the processing sector (refineries) and the food 
sector that uses sugar, an issue better dealt with in a GE framework.  GE also makes it possible to 
assess some particular effects of reforms, such as the impact on employment.  Welfare effects are also 
more easily addressed within a GE framework in the case of second best equilibria (see Gohin and 
Moschini, 2006).  Finally, GE approaches impose an internal coherence because of accounting 
equalities.  This, for example, makes production costs more consistent with prices and rents than in 
many partial equilibrium approaches (Hertel, 2002).  Because production costs play a significant role 
in the characterization of sugar supply, a proper endogenization of returns to primary factors 
accounting for intersectoral linkages is an asset. 
The model focuses on the agricultural and food processing sectors of the EU.  Other countries and 
sectors are treated in a much less detailed way.  The model used this paper is static, with perfect  14
competition in most sectors and a neo-classical closure.  Investment is savings driven and balance of 
payments equilibrium is ensured by financial flows.  A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) was 
constructed for the EU, using original data for the year 1995.  The sectoral coverage distinguishes 75 
products, including 18 products in the arable crops sector, 29 products in the animal sector.  There are 
three primary factors (capital, labor and land), whose quantities remain constant, but which are mobile 
across sectors.  The EU is a large country whose trade affects other regions' exports prices through a 
series of export supply and demand functions.  The model has four main original features, which are:  
i) the use of flexible forms which globally satisfy regularity conditions for production technology, 
household preferences and factor mobility ii) a detailed disaggregation of the agricultural sector;  iii) a 
detailed representation of all instruments of the CAP;  iv/ the use of Mixed Complementarity 
Programming (MCP) methods in order to represent changes in regimes such as production shifts under 
a quota.  The specification used to represent preferences, technologies and factor mobility makes use 
of latent separability.  The model is described in Gohin and Latruffe (2006).  
The modeling of the sugar sector. The sugar sector includes the sugar beet activity which supplies 
"A&B beets", i.e. in-quota beets, "C beets" and the sugar processing sector which offers "A&B sugar", 
"C sugar", "pulps", "molasses".  The in-quota and out-of-quota beets (respectively sugar) are distinct 
products, but perfect substitutes.  They differ in terms of prices, levies and constraints.  Isoglucose is 
modeled as a substitute for sugar.  Sugar beets are assumed to be nontradable.  Sugar is modeled as an 
homogenous product.  Accordingly, a net trade (rather than an Armington) specification is used so that 
the difference between EU sugar exports (A&B and C sugar) minus preferential imports meets a net 
export demand function from non-EU countries.  EU imports are limited by tariff  quotas, which 
generate rents, assumed to be retained by the exporting countries.  The processing sector is represented 
in the model.  Raw sugar is the only type of sugar imported, while only white sugar is exported.  The 
difference in price between raw and refined sugar is kept constant, so that the products behave like 
perfect substitutes.  The modeling of the beet and processing sectors allows for a cross-subsidy 
between A&B and C productions at both stages. The A&B beet and sugar are linked through a 
Leontieff technology, and assumptions must be made regarding the share of the rent passed to the farm 
sector and retained by the processing sector.  The convention that is adopted here is the one used by 
Frandsen et al (2003), with a constant proportion of price decrease between the two sectors as long as 
there remains some positive rents at the two stages. 
The costs of production estimates presented in Table 1 characterize supply response at the national 
(country) level and as mentioned before, we only rely on the average in the EU model.  Here, a full 
blown model of each EU country would be required in order to take into account the differences in 
domestic production costs.  However, one may always argue that the heterogeneous sugar production 
conditions in the EU require a region specific model, or even a farm level model (Mahler, 1994; 
Revoredo, 2005).  Here, we need to combine country specific information on supply and an EU-wide  15
GE model. In order to do so, the GE model is first used to simulate the 2010 baseline, using average 
figures obtained from our econometric estimations.
3  National supply curves are then used to calculate 
country-level supply and production costs under the baseline and the reform scenarios.  The fall in 
domestic production caused by the reform is then introduced into the GE model which is used for 
simulating the overall impact of the corresponding scenario.  This iterative technique makes it possible 
to include the information on supply in the different EU countries while taking advantage of the GE 
model.  
The model focuses on the EU.  In practice, there are also large variations in production costs among 
countries exporting sugar with the EU.  That is, exports of third countries to the EU, including those 
under preferential agreements, might be affected by the change in EU prices.  Information on 
production costs provided by Garside et al (2004), LMC (2004) show that some countries that export 
to the EU, such as Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago are unlikely to 
produce for the EU market after a large cut in EU intervention price.  Their present production is 
driven by the high internal EU price.  However, since we do not consider the possible outcome of a 
revision of the Cotonou regime, we assume that import quotas for ACP countries will remained 
unchanged.  We assume that a country benefiting from a duty free tariff quota will export sugar 
(possibly purchased on the world market) to the EU market, as long as EU domestic price for raw 
sugar is higher than the world price.  In-quota imports with a positive tariff (i.e. imports under the 
Traditional supply needs and Special preferential sugar provisions) will continue as long as the gap 
between the EU domestic price for raw sugar and the world price exceed the tariff.  
 
5. Policy changes simulations 
 
The baseline.  We first define a reference scenario or baseline which corresponds to the situation that 
will take place in 2010, assuming the full implementation of the Agenda 2000, the June 2003 CAP 
reform and the enlargement of the EU, i.e. without the 2005 reform of the sugar sector.  The definition 
of this baseline is of particular importance, since the June 2003 reform might have, in the absence of 
other policy development, favored the production of C sugar in the most efficient regions.  In the 
                                                 
3 In order to calibrate the sugar sector in our CGE model, we first determine the gross margin of both 
beet productions (in and out-of-quota beets).  We use input/output coefficients for a vector of 
intermediate inputs, and returns to land from various sources, including Eurostat SPEL and the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network.  We assume that the sum of the margin of A&B and C beets is exhausted 
in returns to the labor and capital bundle and quota rents.  The econometric estimates of (7) are used to 
calibrate the cross-subsidies between in-quota beets and C beets, assuming that the unitary implicit 
subsidy on C beets adjusts to satisfy budget neutrality (i.e., the total implicit tax on in-quota beets 
equals total implicit subsidy on C beets).  This makes it possible to measure the value of the rent and 
the value of the returns to the capital and labor aggregate.  For the refining sector, a similar calibration 
procedure is done, imposing that only A&B sugar beets are used to produce A&B sugar.  Both A&B 
and C sugar processing produces molasses and pulps.  Unit labor costs cannot adjust in the processing 
sector.  Profit is exhausted in returns to capital and in quota rent.  Again, econometric estimates of (7) 
are used to calculate the rent.  16
present version, the GE model is still calibrated for the year 1995 and we construct this baseline 
scenario as a pre-experiment simulation, updating the relevant data, but using the original structure of 
the matrix (input-output, etc.).  Because the SAM does not include detailed information on the 10 new 
members of the EU, we present only the results for the EU15.  The EU10 are treated as foreign 
countries within a free trade area.  Some variables describing the macroeconomic environment are set 
exogenously, using data from different institutions, including the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute.  Assumptions are also made about technical change in different sectors.  We 
assume, for example that Hicks neutral technical change results in a 1% reduction in unit costs in the 
sugar sector, based on estimates for France (Sourie et al, 2005).  Table 2 presents the baseline, given 
the calibration of the cross-subsidization presented above.  In brief, in the "baseline" column of 
Table 2, the 2005 sugar reform is not implemented, export refunds are only limited by the Uruguay 
Round agreement framework, and we assume that the EU does not face any additional constraint due 
to the WTO dispute on export subsidies or to the Doha Round. 
 
Table 2. EU15 sugar markets under the baseline, after the reform proposal and a ban of 
export subsidies   




Impact of 2005 
reform 
(Scenario 1) 
Total ban of export 
subsidies 
(Scenario 2) 
Scenario 2 /  
scenario 1 
EU15 production of in quota 
beets 











EU15 production of in-quota 
sugar 
















EU15 exports of in quota 
sugar* 










Domestic price of in quota 
beets 
50 €/t  46 €/t   22 €/t  
(-52%) 
16 €/t  
(-65%) 
-27% 
Domestic price of C beets  22 €/t  11 €/t   -  - - 
Domestic price of in quota 
sugar 
687 €/t  632 €/t   404 €/t 
(-36%)  
360 €/t  
(-43%) 
-11% 










Rents (sector)  1 749 mn € 
(beet) 
1 119 mn  
(sugar) 
2203 mn € 
(beet) 
300 mn  
(sugar) 
464 mn € (beet) 








55 mn €  
128 mn €   
 
63 mn €  
141 mn €  
- - - 
* outside EU10..  Source: simulations by the authors. 
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In the baseline, the EU produces and exports some 1.3 million tons of C sugar in addition to the 2.9 
million tons of in-quota sugar exported.  Note that production costs account for cumulative technical 
change up to 2010, which explains the ability of the EU to produce C sugar at a price of 221 € per ton.  
The quota rents amount to 2.6 billion euros, after deduction of a 798 million euros levy for the funding 
of B sugar exports.  Production costs amount to 20 euros per ton of beet and 391 euros per ton of 
sugar, in particular because of the flexibility brought by the 2003 CAP reform. 
Policy scenarios. The model is used for simulations of two scenarios that appear relevant in the 
present policy debate. These are:  
•  Scenario 1: the 2005 reform of the sugar sector is implemented, with no other adjustment 
coming from international pressures. 
•  Scenario 2: the ending of all export subsidies in the sugar sector (including ending of exports 
of C sugar), with no change in the ACP quotas, and without the implementation of the EBA.  
The EU sugar reform.  The 2005 sugar reform includes a 36 percent price cut over four years 
beginning in 2006/07; compensation to farmers at an average of 64.2 percent of the price cut as part of 
the CAP single farm payment.  The "A" and "B" quotas are merged into a single production quota, 
with no quota cuts, unless market situation demands such a measure.  The reform offers the possibility 
for member states to reduce production quotas.  However, the reform allows coupled payments when 
production falls in excess of 50% of the historical quotas.  In addition, some 1.1. million tons of sugar 
will be made available for countries which produced C sugar in the past (firms that overshot internal 
production quotas will be able to access extra quotas against a 730 euro per ton one off payment).  
Finally, some national aids persist, which could limit the fall in production in the least efficient 
regions.
4  
In Table 2, the "Scenario 1" column presents the outcome of the EU reform of the sugar sector.  The 
figures between parentheses are variations in percentage compared to the baseline.  Here, we assume 
that the compensation for the reform provided to the beet producers are decoupled payments, and has 
no impact on output (an assumption that we also use for the single farm payments in the baseline). 
Our econometric estimates of national supply curves for seven countries, and those that we calibrated 
using EU Commission estimates of costs of production, suggest that several countries will not be able 
to economically produce all their quota at a price of 405 euros per ton.  For example, in the case of 
Italy, we estimate that production could decrease by roughly 20% after the cut in intervention price, 
given the supply elasticities.  According to our estimates, a significant share of the EU production 
seems to rely on production costs that exceed the 405 euros per ton.  However, the possibility of 
coupled payments might limit the fall in production to 50% of the initial quota even in least efficient 
                                                 
4  Note that at this stage, the reform was only adopted by the Council, and that we rely on a draft 
regulation.  18
Member states.  If we assume that these (draft) provisions will maintain at least half of the national 
output, we find that the in-quota production would fall by 1.5 million tons relative to the baseline.  
This is this reduction that we introduce in the GE model.   
The EU15 no longer produces C sugar after the reform.  The decrease in intervention price reduces the 
incentive to "overshoot".  Indeed, the asymmetric loss described in equation (4) between one unit 
below or over the targeted quantity is now reduced to a few euros per ton, an amount too small to 
justify overshooting.  The overall simulation of the reform with the GE model suggests that the 
combination of the decrease in in-quota sugar and C sugar, EU production will fall by 2.7 million tons 
of white sugar.  This estimate is likely to be an upper bound given the possibility left for national aids 
and for coupled payments in case of large fall in production, and the extra quota that could be 
purchased by most efficient regions (the draft regulation states that sugar undertakings that produced C 
sugar during the marketing year 2004/2005 may request from the Member State where they are 
established the allocation of an additional quota).  Our estimates suggest that the decrease in EU 
production after the reform will be more limited than what has been forecasted by the Commission 
(EU Commission 2005).  The Commission estimates rely on a proposal where coupled payments were 
not allowed, and where quota mobility between countries was allowed.  Our figures are consistent 
with an average EU production cost of 370 euros per ton, a reference price of 404 euros per ton for 
white sugar and a world price of 261 euros per ton. 
Figures in Table 2 show that the fall in beet prices is larger in percentage terms, than the fall in sugar 
price.  Our figures are therefore inconsistent with the draft regulation that specifies that the minimum 
price for sugar beets will be reduced by 39.5% only.  However, we find that the reform exhausts the 
rents to the processing sector.  At some point, the adjustment will need to be borne by beet growers.  
Our finding is obviously linked to our assumption that some of the unit costs of the processing sector 
are difficult to reduce, such as energy and labor costs.  However, we believe that, even under 
alternative assumptions on the sharing of the rents, processors are likely to put pressure on the farm 
sector, and that it is unlikely that the 36% decrease in the price of the final product can be compatible 
with a 39.5% decrease in the price of the beet input, given the low elasticity in the demand of other 
inputs. 
The fall in prices only results in a slight expansion of consumption.  The EU demand for sugar is very 
inelastic in our GE model.  Such a low elasticity is questionable.  However, it is noteworthy that 
opportunities for substituting sugar for sweeteners are limited:  unlike the US one, the EU soft drink 
sector does not use large quantities of isoglucose that could be replaced by beet sugar even if the latter 
became much cheaper.  Other studies also find little expansion of consumption following lower sugar 
prices (Eurocare 2003).  19
The reform provides a considerable degree of freedom for lowering EU tariff protection.  Indeed, 
without the reform, we estimate that the minimal protection necessary to prevent sugar (outside tariff 
quotas) from flowing into the EU in 2010 is 412  euros per ton of white sugar.  The non-preferential 
tariff is presently 339 euros per ton for raw sugar and 419 euros per ton of white sugar.  After the 
reform, the gap between the domestic and world price for EU sugar would fall to 143 euro per ton of 
white sugar.  That is, the EU community preference can be maintained with a significant decrease in 
MFN tariff.  Clearly, the reform would be a major step towards compatibility with a WTO agreement 
under the Doha Round.   
Our simulations for Scenario 1 suggest that the sugar reform will result in minor changes outside the 
sugar sector.  In the EU15, 360 000 hectares will be reallocated to other enterprises, mainly grains, and 
in particular soft wheat.  This will result in a limited decrease in the cost of feedstuffs with a small 
impact on livestock producers.  The reform should also result in a limited increase in the production of 
vegetables.  The reform should lead to 680 million euros of estimated welfare gains.  However, this 
results from conflicting effects, since the loss for sugar beet producers is significant (1.7 billion euros).  
Given the estimated compensation paid to producers, their net losses should amount to some 550 
million euros.  The fall in production of refined sugar results in a decrease of some 1.2 billion euros in 
value added for the processing sector.  The fall in employment is limited in the farm sector because of 
the reallocation of resources to other sectors (we find a decrease of 3000 jobs in the EU15 farm 
sector), but is larger in the processing sector (5500 jobs).  EU taxpayers save roughly some 
900 million euros of export subsidies.  
Overall, the reform provides some degrees of freedom to the EU in terms of WTO commitments, 
including market access, domestic support and export competition.  The reform brings export 
subsidies down to a level which is consistent with the conclusions of the 2005 WTO ruling.  
Nevertheless, this sugar reform alone hardly addresses longer terms constraints, unless trade 
liberalization in other countries, and in particular the US, results in a large increase in the world price, 
which seems unlikely (Bouët et al, 2005).   
The elimination of export refunds.  Following the WTO dispute and the panel requested by Brazil, 
Australia and Thailand, the 2005 ruling of the Appellate Body implies that EU subsidized exports have 
to be reduced (Both the re-exportation of ACP/India preferential imports and the sale of C sugar on the 
world market were found to be in violation of the maximum subsidized export commitments).  
However, the EU CMO faces other constraints in the longer run.  Indeed, all subsidized exports must 
be eliminated by 2013, following the Ministerial meeting of the WTO in December 2005.  
Scenario 2 includes the elimination of all subsidized exports, including the C sugar relative to the 
baseline (i.e. assuming that the 2005 sugar reform has not taken place).  We also assume that the duty  20
free quotas granted to ACP and India remain unchanged, and that the EBA agreement does not result 
in extra imports, an assumption that we discuss later.  
The ending of export subsidies might be obtained by reducing the level of the sugar quota.  However, 
here, we assume that the domestic price EU adjusts to clear the market.  Results are presented in 
Table 2, column "Scenario 2". The figures in parentheses indicate the change relative to the baseline.  
The changes relative to the situation after the 2005 reform are provided in the right hand side 
column of Table 2. 
With no possibility of using subsidies to dispose excess supply on the world market, a considerable 
decrease in sugar prices is needed to clear the EU market (43% relative to the baseline, i.e. a further 
11% decrease after the implementation of the 2005 reform).  The required fall in the price of sugar 
beets would even be larger because we assumed that wages and some input prices could not decrease 
in the processing sector.  Even though the domestic price would still be 30% higher than the world 
price, all rents would disappear in the EU sector.  Such a fall in EU domestic prices would make larger 
cuts in tariffs possible.  That is, the WTO discipline on export competition (ban on export subsidies) 
seems more constraining that the WTO discipline on market access in the sugar sector.  
The fall in domestic price required to eliminate export refunds would erode the rent for preferential 
imports of sugar under tariff rate quotas.  The difference between domestic prices and world prices 
would barely be enough to sustain the present imports facing a positive tariff (the Traditional supply 
needs and the Special preferential sugar, whose future after 2009 is, anyway, uncertain due to the full 
implementation of the EBA). Indeed, the rent associated to the tariff quota would fall to almost zero 
for these two categories of imports under scenario 2. 
Table 2 shows that the 2005 reform will not be sufficient to reach the objectives of the elimination of 
all export refunds, which would require a decrease of some 4 million tons of output, relative to the 
baseline.  It is likely that, rather than a price decrease as the one assumed under Scenario 2, the level 
of quotas will be adjusted. Indeed, according to the draft regulation following the November 2005 
Council decision, the Commission will be mandated to “withdraw” a percentage of quota sugar if the 
market situation demands it.  Note, however, that the WTO negotiations on market access will 
interfere.  Sugar tariffs will be in the highest band which is likely to face very large cuts (e.g. a 60% 
cut under the 2005 EU proposal and 80% under the 2005 US proposal).  With such tariff cuts, 
competition from imports would force the EU to lower domestic price, in addition to adjusting the 
level of production quota.  A reduction in domestic price in line with the one found in Scenario 2 
could be required, even if the EU chose to fill WTO constraints with a tighter supply control. 
Finally, the sector will face constraints which have not been included in the Scenario 2.  This is 
particularly the case of the preferential imports under the EBA initiative.  The EU sugar market will be 
entirely open to exports from LDCs in 2009.  At this point, it is not totally clear whether quotas or  21
rules of origin requirements will eventually limit the EBA concessions of full and unlimited access 
(Talks, 2005).  In addition, uncertainty persists regarding the ability of LDCs to become major 
suppliers to the EU market due to the lower EU prices and supply side constraints.  EBA sugar may 
also displace ACP imports.  However, during the transition period, LDCs have shown that they were 
already making full use of their tariff rate quotas (74 185 tons of white-sugar equivalent in 2001/2002 
supposed to aise to 197 355 tons in 2008/2009, July to June marketing year).  This suggests that some 
significant imports could take place, perhaps some 2.2 million tons, after 2009 according to some 
estimates (EU Commission 2005).  These imports would need to be offset by a corresponding 
reduction in EU production.  Clearly, the 2005 reform would need, in that case, to be complemented 
by either a significant cut in quota, or a considerable cut in prices, that would bring the EU sugar 
prices much closer to the world price. 
In brief, there is large uncertainty on whether LDCs would be able to export sugar if the EU domestic 
price decreased.  There is also a considerable uncertainty regarding the possible non food utilization of 
sugar beets or cane, and the resulting world market price.  However, unless the EU finds some WTO 
compatible ways to dispose surplus (which should exclude export subsidies), it is likely that further 




The various assessments of the effects of a liberalization of world sugar markets are quite inconsistent.  
We believe that a significant explanation of the observed differences in results lies in the specification 
of the supply response of the EU, and in particular relates to the assumption regarding C sugar 
production.  The supply of C sugar can be affected by the support provided to in-quota sugar through 
three channels: i/ the existence of fixed costs covered by the in-quota sugar, that may explain that C 
sugar can be sold at prices that cover only marginal (variable) costs; ii/ "overshooting" behavior, as 
insurance against poor yields; iii/ the production of C sugar as "reference building" in view of 
expected reforms.   
Microeconomic analysis of the determinants of EU sugar supply do not lead to conclude that the in 
quota sugar formally cross subsidizes the production of C sugar.  Indeed, the fixed-costs effect cannot 
explain a cross-subsidy in the long run, and under the "reference building" effect, the supply of C 
sugar only responds to expected (future) in-quota prices.  However, they are uncertainties about the 
time horizon and the divisibility of inputs in the processing sector.  The "overshooting effect" may also 
make the supply of C sugar dependent on the level of the in-quota price.  Overall, the positive impact 
of the quota rent and the quota level on the supply of C sugar deserves to be taken into account in the 
representation of the EU sugar supply.  We introduce some interaction between the quota and the 
supply of marginal sugar production  in our model.  We calibrate the supply of C beets and sugar using   22
econometric estimates.  We then include such a specification in a GE model including a detailed 
representation of the sugar sector.  
Our simulations suggest that the 2005 reform of the EU sugar sector will lead to the end of C sugar 
exports, and that the fall in prices will provide significant degree of freedom for coping with the need 
to reduce significantly the EU sugar tariffs under the WTO negotiations.  The reform should also make 
it possible to cope with short run constraints imposed by the WTO panel such as the cut of refunds by 
an amount corresponding to the sum of ACP sugar imports and the C sugar.  The losses for sugar beet 
producers and processors will be significant, although they are partially compensated.  The reform 
should also result in savings for taxpayers and consumers.  Overall, the reform should result in a 
higher welfare for the EU15, even though cheaper sugar might raises some public health issues that 
are not accounted for in the model.  However, our simulations suggest that the 2005 reform is not 
sufficient to address longer term commitments such as a complete elimination of export subsidies.  It 
is difficult to predict future world prices for sugar, in particular given the possible development of non 
food use of sugar cane and beets.  However, it is likely that the extra pressure added by preferential 
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The time series used in the econometric estimations were tested for stationarity using the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) with drift as well as with the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPPSS) tests for stationarity (Kwiatkowski et al 1992).  As it is well known, 
none of these tests is fully conclusive, especially when used on small samples.  The  ADF 
tests for the rejection of non stationarity. If the value of this statistic is lower than the critical 
value of –3.6, then this means that we can reject at 5% level of confidence the hypothesis of 
non-stationarity. KPSS test has stationarity as the null hypothesis and the unit root as the 
alternative. Again, if the value of this statistic is lower than the critical value of 0.146, we can 
not reject at the 5% level of confidence the hypothesis of stationarity.  
Table A1 shows the values of these two tests for all variables estimated (sugar beet acreage 
by Member States) as well as for the prices entering the French equation. The number of lag 
in the ADF test is determined according to the Durbin Watson test. As it is often the case, 
these two tests are not always consistent.  For instance, according to the ADF test, we can not 
reject the assumption that the UK sugar beet area variable is non stationary but according to 
the KPSS test, we can not reject the hypothesis of stationarity.  It appears in Table A1 that for 
no series did we find the two tests in favor of non stationarity.  With this fragile conclusion, 
we are only able to be cautious about the inferences on our econometric estimates.  
 
Table A1. Augmented Dickey Fuller and KPSS tests 
 ADF  test 
(critical value <-3.60) 
KPSS test 
(critical value <0.146) 








































The equation that is estimated corresponds to (7) in the paper.  The series are annual data 
from 1981. Data sources include Eurostat for acreages and p2 (spot sugar prices, London) is 
from the annual report of the Confédération Générale de la Betterave.  Data for p1 including 
various taxes are taken from van der Linde et al (2002) and from Confédération Générale de 
la Betterave. All prices were deflated by the GNP price using Eurostat data. Price and yields 
are expressed as an arithmetic average over the past three years. Various specifications with 
trends and lagged variables were tested, but the naïve expectation specification fit the data 
best.   26
The Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) method allows us to consistently and efficiently 
estimate equations with with nonnegativity constraints and relatively few degrees of freedom 
without imposing restrictions on the error process. The GME estimates are robust even if 
errors are not normal and the exogenous variables are correlated.  Entropy is used to measure 
the uncertainty (state of knowledge) we have about the occurrence of a collection of events.  
Given x a random variable with possible outcomes xs, s=1,2,..,N, with probabilities πs , the 
entropy of the distribution π= ( π1 , …. πN ) is  
1 , ln ) (
1 1




s s with S π π π π                                             
S reaches a maximum when all the πs are equal , and a minimum when one of the πs is equal 
to one. In order to recover the unknown πs that characterize M moments of a given dataset, 
one can maximize entropy subject to sample moment information.  Using a sample of T 
draws of an identically and independently distributed random variable x that can take N 
values xt with probabilities πt,.  The number of times xs occurs, fs, defines a vector of 
outcomes (fi,…fN) such as Σ s fs=T.  Maximization of entropy S relies on the idea of selecting 
the vector of outcomes that is most likely to be drawn.  The frequency that maximizes entropy 
is an estimate of the true distribution which can be altered by extra (sample or non sample) 
information.  The ME method picks the distribution consistent with the data which is closest 
to the uniform distribution.  The GME approach uses each observation by treating moment 
conditions as stochastic restrictions.    The parameters to be estimated are expressed as 
probabilities using a support space (i.e. a set of discrete points that are uniform intervals 
symmetric) and a vector of corresponding unknown weights.  The GME estimator maximizes 
the joint entropy of all the probabilities representing the parameters to be estimated and the 
error terms subject to the data and the various constraints.  The various desirable properties 
described by Golan et al (2001) include the ability to impose non linear and inequality 
constraints, and the efficiency of the estimator with small samples.  
In practice, we set support values for parameters and residuals as triplets {-α, 0, α}. An initial 
value of the parameters to be estimated is set, and entropy is maximized under the constraints 
that the data matches equation (7) and the various constraints imposed: b>0; 0<f<1; θ≥0; p1 
≥θ+ p2.  
Estimation results are provided in Table A2. The stars indicate estimators significantly 
different from zero, respectively at the 10% and 5% threshold.  It is noteworthy that most of 
the parameters of interest, i.e. parameters b, f, e, are significantly different from zero (with the 
exception of Italy, the adjustment is satisfactory).  This suggests that the specification 
adopted, where the usual marginal become Cm=p2+θ,  θ  is indeed a a positive function of p1, 
a negative function of p2 and a positive function of the quota. 
Table A2. Estimation results 
   R2  DW  b  e  f 
Netherlands    0.83 1.92 1.09**  0.57*  0.69** 
UK  0.60 2.08 3.97**  0.76**  0.99** 
Belgium    0.82 1.95 3.74**  0.61*  0.38** 
  France  0.78 1.80 0.32**  0.45*  0.34* 
Germany  0.96 1.89 0.36**  0  0.56* 
Spain  0.87 1.76 2.82**  0  0.65** 
Italy  0.45 1.72 0.67**  2.64**  0.001** 
 